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Shareholder Activism as a Corrective Mechanism in 
Corporate Governance 
 
Paul Rose and Bernard S. Sharfman∗ 
Under an Arrowian framework, centralized authority and 
management provides for optimal decision making in large 
organizations. However, Kenneth Arrow also recognized that other 
elements within the organization, beyond the central authority, 
occasionally may have superior information or decision-making skills. 
In such cases, such elements may act as a corrective mechanism within 
the organization. In the context of public companies, this Article finds 
that such a corrective mechanism comes in the form of hedge fund 
activism, or, more accurately, offensive shareholder activism. 
 
Offensive shareholder activism operates in the market for corporate 
influence, not control. Consistent with a theoretical framework that 
protects the value of centralized authority and a legal framework that 
rests fiduciary responsibility with the board, authority is not shifted to 
influential, yet unaccountable, shareholders. Governance entrepreneurs 
in the market for corporate influence must first identify those instances 
in which authority-sharing may result in value-enhancing policy 
decisions, and then persuade the board and/or other shareholders of the 
wisdom of their policies, before they will be permitted to share the 
authority necessary to implement the policy. Thus, boards often reward 
offensive shareholder activists that prove to have superior information 
and/or strategies by at least temporarily sharing authority with the 
activists by either providing them seats in the board or simply allowing 
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them to directly influence corporate policy. This Article thus reframes 
the ongoing debate on the value of shareholder activism by showing how 
offensive shareholder activism can co-exist with—and indeed, is 
supported by—Kenneth Arrow’s theory of management centralization, 
which undergirds the traditional authority model of corporate 
governance. 
This Article also provides a much-needed bridge between the 
traditional authority model of corporate law and governance as 
utilized by Professors Steven Bainbridge and Michael Dooley and those 
who have done empirical studies on hedge fund activism, including 
Professor Lucian Bebchuk. This bridge helps to identify when shareholder 
activism may be a positive influence on corporate governance. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION .............................................................. 1017 
I. THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 
AND CORPORATE LAW............................................. 1022 
II. DIFFERENTIATING SHAREHOLDERS .............................. 1029 
III. OFFENSIVE SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM ......................... 1034 
A. Offensive Shareholder Activism as a Sharing of 
Authority ................................................................. 1037 
B. The Small Problem of Uninformed Shareholders ............. 1038 
C. Empirical Analysis of Offensive Shareholder Activism .... 1039 
IV. SHORT-TERM VERSUS LONG-TERM INVESTORS ............. 1044 
A. The Intrinsic Value Argument ..................................... 1047 
B. Proxy Access ................................................................ 1049 









01.SHARFMAN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/22/2015 4:56 PM 




Shareholder activism can be defined to include any action(s) of 
any shareholder or shareholder group with the purpose of bringing 
about change within a public company1 without trying to gain 
control.2 In contrast to Henry Manne’s famous description of the 
“market for corporate control,”3 shareholder activism exists in a 
“market for corporate influence.”4 However, both markets share two 
important premises: First, there is “a high positive correlation 
between corporate managerial efficiency and the market price of 
shares of that company.”5 Second, “[a]part from the stock market, 
we have no objective standard of managerial efficiency.”6 
The debate on shareholder activism tends to focus on whether 
shareholder activism in general is appropriate, with zealous advocates 
 
 1. For our purposes, a public company can be defined as a for-profit organization that 
is publicly traded but does not have a controlling shareholder. Thus, public companies include 
the largest of companies, such as Apple, General Electric, Microsoft, ExxonMobil, IBM, and 
General Motors, as well as thousands of other much smaller corporations that are still of 
significant size. For a more theoretical definition, see Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of 
Corporate Governance, 47 BUS. LAW. 461, 463 n.9 (1992) (“The term ‘publicly held firm’ is 
meant to describe . . . economic organizations in which (i) management and residual claimant 
status (shareholding) are separable and separated functions; (ii) the residual claims (shares) are 
held by a number of persons; and (iii) the residual claims are freely transferable and neither 
entry to nor exit from the firm is restricted.”). 
 2. Professors Stuart Gillian and Laura Starks note: “Shareholder activists are often 
viewed as investors who, dissatisfied with some aspect of a company’s management or 
operations, try to bring about change within the company without a change in control.” Stuart 
L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States, 19 
J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 55, 55 (2007). 
 3. Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 
110, 115–17 (1965). Manne’s contribution to our understanding of how markets, especially 
the stock market, influence corporate governance cannot be understated. See William J. 
Carney, The Legacy of “The Market for Corporate Control” and the Origins of the Theory of the 
Firm, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 215 (1999). 
 4. Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder 
Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 58 (2011). As pointed out by Henry Manne, 
there is a significant inter-relationship between the market for corporate control and the 
market for corporate influence. Manne, supra note 3. The development of the market for 
corporate influence has no doubt been helped by federal securities and state corporate laws 
that have greatly inhibited the market for corporate control. 
 5. Manne, supra note 3, at 112. Manne used this premise to establish that the control 
of corporations may constitute a valuable asset in and of itself. Id. 
 6. Id. at 113. 
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lauding its virtues and opponents drawing attention to its vices. If 
shareholder activism is a front in a wider battle between managerial 
capitalism—an approach to corporate governance that incorporates 
the primary norm of managing the corporation for the benefit of all 
stakeholders—and shareholder-centric capitalism—managing the 
corporation primarily for the benefit of shareholders—the 
shareholder-centric model is increasingly gaining control.7 
Managerial capitalism, whatever its virtues, is fighting a rearguard 
action against the proponents of shareholder power.8 This defensive 
action is made more difficult by the fact that federal regulation 
increasingly supports the shareholder-centric view.9 This support 
suggests that shareholder activism will likely continue to be a central 
feature of corporate governance for years to come. 
Shareholder activism comes in at least two primary forms and 
several sub-forms. Performance-driven activism, usually instigated by 
hedge funds, focuses on advocating for significant changes in 
corporate strategy to increase the market price of a company’s stock. 
Corporate governance activism, on the other hand, focuses on 
changes in a public company’s governance arrangements, executive 
compensation, and social policy.10 In some cases, this second type of 
activism is used as a vehicle to achieve the first. For example, an 
activist hedge fund may support or even initiate corporate 
governance changes, such as the elimination of a staggered board, in 
order to reduce managerial insulation, which in turn allows the 
hedge fund to more effectively influence performance-driven 
corporate changes. 
Even though shareholder activism has been a feature of 
corporate governance for over one hundred years,11 only recently 
 
 7. See Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1907, 1911–26 (2013). 
 8. The decline of managerial capitalism can be directly linked to the rise of the 
independent director. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United 
States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 
(2007). 
 9. See Paul Rose, Common Agency and the Public Corporation, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 
1356–59 (2010) (describing the shareholder-empowering function of numerous recent federal 
regulations). 
 10. James R. Copland, Yevgeniy Feyman & Margaret O’Keefe, Proxy Monitor 2012: 
A Report on Corporate Governance and Shareholder Activism, CTR. FOR LEGAL POLICY AT THE 
MANHATTAN INST. 11 (2012), http://www.proxymonitor.org/forms/pmr_04.aspx. 
 11. See Gillan & Starks, supra note 2. Gillan and Starks trace shareholder activism back 
to the early 1900s when U.S. financial institutions were active participants in corporate 
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have all the pieces come together for shareholder activism to become 
a powerful force in corporate governance. These pieces include the 
growing dominance of institutional investors in the investment of 
publicly held stock,12 helping to reduce investors collective action 
costs;13 the shift from managerial capitalism to shareholder-centric 
capitalism, such that the board of a public company now feels an 
increased need to respond to shareholder demands;14 the 
Department of Labor’s interpretive bulletin advising pension funds 
that proxy voting constituted part of the funds’ fiduciary duties to 
investors;15 the related rise of shareholder advisory services such as 
Institutional Shareholder Services;16 the rise of hedge funds as 
shareholder activists17 and the increasing ability of these hedge funds 
to raise large pools of funds so as to seek significant positions in 
public companies;18 and the SEC’s ideological support of 
shareholder interests.19 This support is evident in various SEC rules 
and policies, including the liberalization of communications between 
shareholders with respect to proxy voting,20 elimination of 
 
governance. Id. They also note that the modern version of shareholder activism received a big 
boost in 1942 when the SEC first allowed shareholders to submit proposals for inclusion on 
corporate ballots. Id. 
 12. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: 
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 865 
(2013) (noting that institutional investors hold over 70% of the outstanding stock of the top 
thousand U.S. public companies). 
 13. Collective action costs means that “shareholders generally will not make an effort to 
effect governance changes unless the benefits resulting from the efforts equal or exceed the 
costs of such an effort. Even when such efforts are made, the benefits may only inure to a 
particular shareholder or a small group of shareholders.” Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance 
Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 898 (2007). 
 14. See Martin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, 43 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 909, 913 (2013) (identifying the shift in the structure of pension plans from 
defined benefit to defined contribution plans as a significant cause of this increased need to 
listen to shareholders). As a result of this shift, pensioners have become less dependent on their 
former employers and more dependent on the capital markets for their pension wealth. See id. 
 15. See Department of Labor Rule on Shareholder Rights Under ERISA, 29 C.F.R. 
§ 2509.08-2 (2008). 
 16. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1277–78 (2008). For a discussion of the costs and benefits of proxy 
voting firms, such as Institutional Shareholder Services, see Rose, supra note 13, passim. 
 17. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 12. 
 18. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 16, at 1278–79. 
 19. See Rose, supra note 9, at 1359. 
 20. See Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No. 
31,326, 52 SEC Docket 2028 (Oct. 16, 1992). 
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discretionary broker voting for the election of directors,21 required 
disclosure of proxy voting by investment companies,22 the SEC’s 
promulgation of Investment Adviser’s Act Rule 206 (4)-6 in 2003 
(requiring investment advisers such as mutual fund companies, to 
“[a]dopt and implement written policies and procedures that are 
reasonably designed to ensure that [advisers] vote client securities in 
the best interest of clients”),23 and some SEC commissioners’ use of 
the populist argument that shareholders must take a more active role 
to constrain reckless risk-taking by corporate managers in order to 
prevent another financial crisis.24 
Such developments mean that shareholder activism is here to 
stay,25 and that both sides in the debate must now consider how 
activism can be utilized to allow corporate decision making to be 
executed in the most efficient manner. This Article seeks to answer 
that question by showing how a certain type of performance-driven 
activism, offensive shareholder activism (typically as a form of hedge 
fund activism), can promote shareholder value and therefore serve a 
beneficial role in corporate governance. In an Arrowian framework 
of corporate governance, offensive shareholder activism is a 
corrective mechanism that can reduce error in corporate decision 
making. As evidenced by the empirical studies described below, 
offensive shareholder activism has established itself as a legitimate 
tool of accountability in corporate governance. The key to the utility 
of such activism on an individual company basis is the transmission 
of information, from the activist to the board, which can enhance 
public company decision making. 
 
 21. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 60,215, 96 SEC 
Docket 654 (July 1, 2009) (discussing the amendment eliminating broker discretionary voting 
for the election of directors). 
 22. See Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered 
Management Investment Companies, Exchange Act Release No. 8,188, 2003 WL 215451 
(Jan. 31, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 239, 249, 270, 274). 
 23. SEC Proxy Voting Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-6 (2011). 
 24. Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of Crisis, 36 J. 
CORP. L. 309, 332–35 (2010). This argument is not supported by any evidence that such 
shareholder empowerment would actually reduce reckless risk-taking in the financial sector or 
that such risk-taking was an issue in the non-financial sectors of the economy leading up to the 
2008 financial crisis. 
 25. This is consistent with Professor Edward Rock’s argument that we have completed 
the transition from a manager-centric to a shareholder-centric system of corporate governance; 
shareholder activists who claim to carry the mantle of shareholder wealth maximization will 
have increased leverage in making their case. See Rock, supra note 7. 
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This Article is timely not only because of the general rise of 
shareholder activism, but also because the debate on corporate 
governance has now shifted to a focus on the market for corporate 
influence. Moreover, this Article provides a much-needed bridge 
between the traditional authority model of corporate law and 
governance, as utilized by Stephen Bainbridge and Michael Dooley, 
and those who have empirically studied hedge fund activism, 
including Lucian Bebchuk, and have found it to be value enhancing. 
The bridge formed in this Article helps to identify when shareholder 
activism may be a positive influence on corporate governance. 
The discussion that follows, when it references state corporate 
law, has been pragmatically framed in the context of Delaware 
corporate law. Delaware is the state where the majority of the largest 
U.S. companies are incorporated,26 and its corporate law often serves 
as the authority that other U.S. states look to when developing their 
own statutory and case law.27 Therefore, the primary examples are 
from Delaware, but the thinking is meant to be global in nature. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the fundamental 
conflict in corporate law that creates shareholder activism. Part II 
explains the various categories of shareholders and why only one type 
of shareholder, the information trader, has the potential to improve 
corporate decision making. Part III examines a specific type of 
information trader, the offensive shareholder activist, and what 
empirical analysis can tell us about their activism. Part IV discusses 
the debate over the alleged short-term time horizon of hedge fund 
activists. Part V concludes by discussing how shareholders, boards, 
and regulators should understand the proper role of shareholder 
activism in corporate decision making. 
 
 26. See LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 1 (2007), 
available at corp.delaware.gov/whycorporations_web.pdf (stating that Delaware is the 
“favored state of incorporation for U.S. businesses”). According to the State of Delaware 
website, Delaware is the legal home to “[m]ore than 50% of all publicly-traded companies in 
the United States including 64% of the Fortune 500.” About Agency, STATE DELAWARE, 
http://corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last visited Oct. 15, 2014). 
 27. See Nadelle Grossman, Director Compliance with Elusive Fiduciary Duties in a 
Climate of Corporate Governance Reform, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 393, 397 (2007). 
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I. THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AND 
CORPORATE LAW 
This Part describes how corporate law centralizes authority in the 
board of directors and how shareholder activism challenges this 
authority. This Part then introduces the argument that in discrete 
situations activism can serve as an important corrective mechanism 
within public companies. 
Shareholder activism is primarily confined to public companies, 
which for our purposes is limited to publicly traded companies with 
no controlling shareholder.28 Public companies almost always take 
the corporate form, not merely because of limited liability, legal 
personality, or transferrable shares—those attributes shared with 
other legal entities, such as limited liability companies (LLCs)—but 
also because of what can be considered corporate law’s most 
underrated attribute: its use of statutory default rules and court 
decisions to protect board decision making from shareholder 
interference.29 
As Robert Clark observed, “the single most important fact of 
corporate law is that managerial power is legally centralized.”30 To 
facilitate a centralized, hierarchical management structure, corporate 
law provides a public company’s board the exclusive authority to 
manage and execute the various forms of explicit and implicit 
contracts that encompass a firm’s contractual makeup.31 However, 
board involvement in day-to-day operations is not necessary, as 
statutory law allows the board to delegate its authority to executive 
management.32 This decentralization frees up many board members 
from having to participate in the day-to-day management of the 
firm, but at the same time consolidates power at the top of a 
corporation’s hierarchy—the board and executive management—
without providing shareholders a role in the decision-making 
process.33 After all, it is the board who decides what authority is to 
 
 28. See supra note 1. 
 29. This large concentration of corporate authority was first identified by Professor 
Adolph Berle and Dr. Gardiner Means writing just after the 1927 and 1929 amendments to 
the Delaware General Corporation Laws. See A.A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, 
Corporations and the Public Investor, 20 AM. ECON. REV. 54, 60 (1930). 
 30. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 21 (1986). 
 31. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011). 
 32. Id. § 142(a). 
 33. See Christopher M. Bruner, Managing Corporate Federalism: The Least-Bad 
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be delegated and to whom. As a result, there is a significant 
imbalance between the authority of the board and the accountability 
that shareholders can provide. Shareholder activism can be 
understood to be the inevitable response to this imbalance. 
Corporate law defers to board authority in many ways, including, 
most notably, selecting the board of the directors to be the default 
locus of authority for corporate decision making. Corporate law vests 
in directors the power to control corporate assets,34 including the 
payment of dividends and other distributions.35 The board is not 
required to follow the commands of its shareholders, even if 
shareholders pass a unanimous resolution requesting the board to act 
in a specific manner.36 Shareholders may ratify a board’s action, but 
the board must first approve the action.37 Corporate law also 
protects the decisions of the board of directors from shareholder 
challenge, and to a great extent immunizes the directors from 
individual liability, by applying the business judgment rule to even 
the board’s most harmful or inept business decisions,38 and allowing 
 
Approach to the Shareholder Bylaw Debate, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 3 (2011). Professor Bruner 
has pointed out that “enacting, amending, and repealing bylaws are essentially the only 
corporate governance actions that shareholders can undertake unilaterally.” Id. Of course, the 
management of a public company still gets the advantage of excluding a number of proposals 
from its proxy materials under the SEC’s Rule 14a-8(i). See SEC Shareholder Proposals Rule, 
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2012) (explaining when a company must include a proposal in its 
proxy materials). 
 34. Delaware General Corporation Law Section 141(a) provides that “[t]he business 
and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the 
direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its 
certificate of incorporation.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011). 
 35. See tit. 8, § 170(a). 
 36. See tit. 8, § 141(a). See also, Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) (“A 
cardinal precept of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware is that directors, 
rather than shareholders, manage the business and affairs of the corporation.”), overruled on 
other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000). For a discussion of how 
corporate law retains decision-making power in the board of directors, even where a majority 
of shareholders oppose the board’s decision, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing 
Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 841 n.8 (2005). 
 37. For example, when a corporation has decided to proceed with a merger proposal, 
the statutory process requires that the board of directors take the lead by initiating the 
proposal with the shareholders participating by voting on the proposal. See tit. 8, § 251(b). 
 38. According to the Delaware Supreme Court: 
Our law presumes that “in making a business decision the directors of a corporation 
acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action 
taken was in the best interests of the company.” Those presumptions can be 
rebutted if the plaintiff shows that the directors breached their fiduciary duty of care 
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for exculpation clauses to relieve directors of personal liability for 
alleged breaches in their duty of care.39 Directors also have the right 
to implement defensive measures to ward off an unwelcome takeover 
bid through the application of the Unocal test, even when a majority 
of shareholders may be willing to accept the bid.40 
Corporate law promotes centralized management because it 
recognizes that a centralized, hierarchical authority—the board of 
directors—is necessary for the successful management of a large for-
profit organization such as a public company. According to Clark, 
hierarchies in large organizations lead to the “facilitation of 
cooperation in the carrying out of large-scale tasks.”41 And according 
to Kenneth Arrow, information scattered over a large organization 
must be both filtered and transmitted to a centralized authority in 
order for a large organization to make informed decisions and 
minimize error in decision making.42 The American Bar Association’s 
Committee on Corporate Laws also noted the benefits of centralized 
authority, stating, “the deployment of diverse investors’ capital by 
centralized management maximizes corporate America’s ability to 
 
or of loyalty or acted in bad faith. If that is shown, the burden then shifts to the 
director defendants to demonstrate that the challenged act or transaction was 
entirely fair to the corporation and its shareholders. 
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006) (quoting Aronson, 473 
A.2d at 812). According to Henry G. Manne, the business judgment rule “will preclude the 
courts from any consideration of honest if inept business decisions, and that seems to be the 
purpose of the rule.” Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 
VA. L. REV. 259, 271 (1967). 
 39. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). 
 40. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). 
 41. See CLARK, supra note 30, app. at 801–16 (arguing that “facilitation of cooperation” 
allows for efficiently completing large tasks). 
 42. KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 68–70 (1974). In his seminal 
article on corporate law, Professor Michael Dooley was the first to make the connection 
between the work of Kenneth Arrow and the structure of Delaware corporate law. Dooley, 
supra note 1, at 467. For equally influential articles on the application of Arrow’s work to 
corporate law, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 
IOWA L. REV. 1, 7 (2002); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention 
Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004) [hereinafter Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule]; 
and Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 
97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003). See also Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth 
Maximization and Its Implementation Under Corporate Law, 66 FLA. L. REV. 389 (2014) 
[hereinafter Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth Maximization]; Bernard S. Sharfman, Why Proxy 
Access is Harmful to Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 387 (2012) [hereinafter Sharfman, 
Why Proxy Access is Harmful]. 
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contribute to long-term wealth creation.”43 In sum, corporate law’s 
approach is to enhance corporate decision making and maximize 
shareholder wealth44 by being extremely deferential to board 
decision-making authority. 
The value of centralized authority is especially critical to widely 
held public companies. Michael Dooley observed that the value of 
centralized authority in an organization is magnified as the 
knowledge and interests of its members diverge.45 In a public 
company, information and interests differ between management and 
shareholders.46 Especially where there are a large number of 
shareholders, it is much more efficient, in terms of maximizing 
shareholder value, for the board of directors and executive 
management—the corporate actors that possess overwhelming 
advantages in terms of information, including nonpublic 
information, and whose skills in the management of the company are 
honed by specialization in the management of this one company—to 
make corporate decisions rather than shareholders.47 Moreover, as 
we subsequently discuss in Part II, most shareholders, including 
value traders, have no interest in managing the company, even if they 
have acquired a significant amount of information about the 
company. 
In general, we believe that the explanation behind why public 
companies take the corporate form is consistent with the 
 
 43. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Preserving Director Primacy by Managing Shareholder 
Interventions, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER & ACTIVISM 4 
(forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2298415 
(citing COMM. ON CORP. LAWS OF THE AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF BUS. LAW, REPORT ON 
THE ROLES OF BOARDS OF DIRECTORS AND SHAREHOLDERS OF PUBLICLY OWNED 
CORPORATIONS (2009), available at http://www.hunton.com/media/SEC_Proxy 
/ PDF/SEC_Agenda_Section2.PDF). 
 44. For purposes of this Article, we assume that shareholder wealth maximization is the 
corporate objective both in terms of corporate governance and corporate law. See Shareholder 
Wealth Maximization, supra note 42, for a discussion of shareholder wealth maximization as 
the objective of both corporate governance and corporate law. 
 45. Dooley, supra note 1, at 467 (“Where the residual claimants are not expected to run 
the firm and especially when they are many in number (thus increasing disparities in 
information and interests), their function becomes specialized to risk-bearing, thereby creating 
both the opportunity and necessity for managerial specialists.”). 
 46. See id. at 466–67. The value of centralized authority is not as great in general 
partnerships and closely-held corporations because the same persons perform both the 
managerial and risk-taking (investment) functions. See id. at 466. Management and partners or 
shareholders are essentially one and the same. See id. 
 47. See id. 
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contractarian explanation, that the default rules provided by 
corporate law are, for the most part, “market mimicking.”48 This is 
especially true for rules that govern the relationship between the 
board and shareholders. We say this because, as we have already 
discussed, we believe corporate law correctly provides authority to 
the board and its executive officers, and therefore it is doubtful that 
private ordering that significantly shifts decision making to 
shareholders will enhance the efficiency of this relationship.49 
But even in the context of the largest corporations,50 corporate 
law’s great deference toward board authority is not absolute and was 
 
 48. This phrase was coined by Professor Bernard Black. See Bernard S. Black, Is 
Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 552 
(1990). 
 49. However, we concede that because of transaction costs that exist in the real world, 
the extensive use of corporate law’s default rules by public companies is not entirely the result 
of these rules being contractually efficient. In that regard, we are sympathetic to the argument 
made by Michael Klausner, who persuasively argues that the uniformity and stickiness in 
corporate governance arrangements at public companies is due to significant transaction costs 
and not the result of efficient private ordering in a theoretically cost-free environment. Michael 
Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 
791–93 (2006) [hereinafter Klausner, The Contractarian Theory]; see also Michael Klausner, 
Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 826–29 (1995). 
Klausner provides the following, non-market mimicking explanation for the prevalent use of 
corporate law’s default rules in corporate charters: 
There is inherent uncertainty regarding how courts will apply and interpret any but 
the most simple legal rules, contract terms, or charter terms. This uncertainty is a 
cost of legal enforcement. As a legal rule or charter term is interpreted and applied 
in a variety of settings, however, the term acquires more content, and uncertainty 
regarding its application declines. As a result, enforcement costs decline. 
Klausner, The Contractarian Theory, supra at 793 (citing Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, 
Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 
83 VA. L. REV. 713, 719–25, 731–33 (1997)). The result is that the corporate charter is a 
relatively simplistic and abbreviated document that by its silence incorporates the default rules 
of corporate law. See id. at 789–90. For example, Klausner discusses empirical evidence that 
describes how the governance arrangements of companies filing for initial public offerings are 
remarkably uniform. See id. at 790–91; see also Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate 
Law and Governance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1336–37 (2013). The only significant variability 
occurs in how much protection should be given a board from the threat of a hostile takeover. 
See Klausner, The Contractarian Theory, supra at 790. 
 50. Why a corporation would decide to produce what it needs internally, and thereby 
grow to great size, instead of contracting for all its needs in the relevant market, is a function 
of transaction costs and the marginal analysis that goes into determining the better alternative. 
See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 393−97 (1937). Such a 
need for large size arises in this because “managers continuously compare the incremental costs 
and payoffs of internal production (expansion or vertical integration) against external 
procurement, chosing [sic] whichever alternative provides the best payoff until the two are 
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never meant to be. Corporate law recognizes that a certain amount 
of accountability, even if infrequently and lightly applied, is required 
to control for error in corporate decision making as it relates to a 
board’s cognitive and behavioral limitations in the context of small-
group decision making,51 as well as the more widely discussed 
opportunistic (self-interested) behavior by directors and executive 
management when there is a wide separation of authority between 
share ownership and management.52 Such opportunistic behavior 
includes corporate management shirking its duties or trying to 
extract private benefits from the corporation.53 These types of 
behavior lead to agency costs in public companies.54 
Given this preference for centralized authority, it is not 
unexpected that corporate law has created significant roadblocks for 
shareholder activists to overcome. However, these roadblocks are not 
 
equalized at the margin.” Herbert Hovenkamp, Coasean Markets, 31 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 63, 
68 (2011). The point of optimal firm size, which means the corporation may become very 
large in size, is a function of this marginal analysis. See id. at 71. 
 51. Arrow discussed this in terms of the centralized authority (the small group in charge 
of decision making such as a board of directors) becoming a victim of information overload. 
ARROW, supra note 42, at 74. The problem of information overload is compounded “by the 
tendency in that situation to filter information in accordance with one’s preconceptions.” Id. at 
75. Another issue is group polarization, the tendency of a small deliberative group with an 
initial tendency to move in a given direction to move to even more extreme positions in that 
direction following group deliberations. See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why 
Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 74 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: 
Statistical Means, Deliberation, and Information Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1004 
(2005); Cass R. Sunstein & Reid Hastie, Four Failures of Deliberating Groups 20 (Univ. of 
Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 401, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1121400; see also Bernard S. Sharfman 
& Steven J. Toll, Dysfunctional Deference and Board Composition: Lessons from Enron, 103 NW. 
U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 153, 155 (2008). 
 52. See Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule, supra note 42, at 107. 
 53. See Dooley, supra note 1, at 465. 
 54. See Rose, supra note 9, at 1361 (citing Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, 
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. 
ECON. 305 (1976)). As explained by Professor Rose: 
Under a classic theory of the firm, agency costs in the corporate context increase as 
ownership is separated from control. As the manager’s ownership of shares in the 
firm decreases as a percentage of the total, the manager will bear a diminishing 
fraction of the costs of any nonpecuniary benefits he takes out in maximizing his 
own utility. To prevent the manager from maximizing his utility at the expense of 
the shareholders, shareholders will seek to constrain the manager’s behavior by 
aligning the manager’s interests with the shareholders’ interests. 
Id. at 1361 (citations omitted). 
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insurmountable. Shareholder activists still have the right to advocate 
for a voice in operational decision making not only through 
engagement with executive management, but also through the threat 
of a proxy contest, binding by-law proposals,55 or non-binding 
shareholder proposals if such changes are not implemented. 
Shareholders may also legally challenge board decisions on both a 
derivative and direct basis, seeking either to enjoin the board 
decision or to obtain an award of damages for decisions already 
made. Finally, shareholders also have the right to inspect a 
corporation’s books and records for a proper purpose.56 
However, an increase in accountability brought about by 
shareholder activism does not necessarily result in enhanced 
corporate decision making. The risk is that in the process of trying to 
correct or prevent errors resulting from poor managerial decisions, 
“the genuine values of authority” will be destroyed.57 Such “a 
sufficiently strict and continuous organ of responsibility can easily 
amount to a denial of authority.”58 Arrow suggests, “if every decision 
of A is to be reviewed by B, then all we have really is a shift in the 
locus of authority from A to B and hence no solution to the original 
problem.”59 For example, allowing every major board decision to be 
reviewed and voted on by shareholders inhibits the ability of 
corporate managers to make the most efficient and wealth-
maximizing decisions on a timely basis. This implies that “[i]n such a 
scenario, accountability can be understood to cross over the line to 
where a new and competing locus of authority is created—a locus of 
authority, such as uninformed shareholders, that does not benefit 
from the informational advantages of the original authority.”60 Thus, 
in order to make sure that corporate decision making is allowed to 
maximize the value of centralized authority, thereby getting as close 
to shareholder wealth maximization as possible, shareholders must 
accept a certain amount of group decision-making error and agency 
 
 55. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (2011). 
 56. See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Horton, 631 A.2d 1, 3–4 (Del. 1993) 
(discussing the statutory right of stockholders under Delaware General Corporation Law 
Section 220(b) to inspect the company books if they have a proper purpose and how public 
policy may allow inspection even if it is adverse to the corporation’s interests). 
 57. ARROW, supra note 42, at 78. 
 58. Id. (emphasis added). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth Maximization, supra note 42, at 406. 
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costs as a part of this decision-making process. 
The central problem in the market for corporate influence is 
identifying when the costs of protecting board authority become large 
enough that corrective action by shareholders—beyond merely 
waiting until the next director election—is justified. Arrow, the 
intellectual godfather of the traditional authority model of corporate 
law and governance, suggested that from time to time it may be more 
efficient to allow for a corrective mechanism to exist in a large 
organization. That is, the central authority recognizes that a part of 
the organization outside itself may have superior information or 
decision-making skills.61 From this we can infer that a shift in decision-
making authority from the board to a company’s shareholders may 
possibly be more efficient and enhance shareholder wealth in certain 
discrete situations. However, consistent with a legal framework in 
which fiduciary responsibility rests with the board and, to some 
extent, controlling shareholders, in practice, authority does not shift to 
unaccountable shareholders, but is at least temporarily shared.62 
Governance entrepreneurs in the market for corporate influence 
must first identify those instances in which authority-sharing may 
result in value-enhancing policy decisions, and then persuade the 
board and/or other shareholders of the wisdom of their policies so 
that they will be permitted to share the authority necessary to 
implement the policies. The following Part discusses how and why 
some shareholder activists are successful in identifying these 
opportunities to influence. 
II. DIFFERENTIATING SHAREHOLDERS 
The type and quality of shareholder activism is a function of the 
type of shareholder that is involved. To see why this is so, we must 
first understand that shareholders in a public company can differ not 
only in terms of how much information and skill they possess 
relevant to corporate decision making, but also in their interest in 
being involved in such decision making. 
A public company’s stockholders can be differentiated based on 
the roles they play in the equity markets. These groups include  
 
 61. ARROW, supra note 42, at 74–75. 
 62. Because they only have influence and not control, governance entrepreneurs such as 
offensive activists rely on some degree of board and managerial cooperation in order to 
facilitate their desired changes. 
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insiders, liquidity traders, noise traders, market makers, and 
information traders.63 
Insiders are stockholders, including directors and executive 
management, who have access to nonpublic information about the 
firm, but have significant restrictions in the trading of that 
information for profit.64 Insiders, of course, do not participate in 
shareholder activism.65 
Liquidity traders do not collect and evaluate information; rather, 
they participate in the market depending on their funding needs.66 
Liquidity traders are typically passive, index fund investors;67 thus, 
combined with the benefits of limited liability, such index fund 
investors “utilize portfolio diversification to eliminate the 
unsystematic risk associated with their equity investment.”68 These 
traders generally have little or no information about any of the 
companies they hold in their portfolio, no identified skills in decision 
making, and no interest in the particular corporate decision making 
of the hundreds or thousands of companies they invest in.69 This 
group of investors is the stereotype for those who believe 
shareholders are “rationally apathetic.”70 Therefore, the disparities 
between management and shareholders are maximized with respect 
to liquidity traders. Thus, because they have no information or 
interest in participating in corporate decision making, their 
participation in corporate decision making is likely to be weakly 
informed or perhaps driven by opportunistic behavior. 
Noise traders are, in the context of informationally efficient 
 
 63. See Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities 
Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 722 (2006). This approach focuses on shareholders as having 
different functions in the equity markets versus having heterogeneous interests in the holding 
of company stock and the effects on corporate governance. See id. at 722–26. For the latter 
approach, see Rose, supra note 9. 
 64. Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 63, at 722. 
 65. As a reminder, shareholder activism only takes place in the market for corporate 
influence, not in the market for corporate control. See supra notes 1–4 and text accompanying 
notes. 
 66. Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 63, at 724. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Bernard S. Sharfman, What’s Wrong with Shareholder Empowerment?, 37 J. CORP. L. 
903, 906 (2012). 
 69. See id. 
 70. Id. 
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markets, irrational investors. They utilize diverse investment 
strategies.71 Some noise traders may invest based on fads and rumors, 
while others may rely on old information or are simply slower in 
analyzing information that is publicly available.72 Like liquidity 
traders, when they participate in shareholder activism or corporate 
voting, their participation is most likely to be weakly informed or 
perhaps driven by opportunistic behavior. 
Market makers are professionals who facilitate trading and 
maintain a market for securities by offering to buy or sell securities 
on a regular basis.73 Although market makers are well informed 
about the demand and supply of a security, they may not be well 
informed regarding firm-specific information.74 Again, like liquidity 
traders and noise traders, when they participate in shareholder 
activism or corporate voting, market makers are most likely to be 
weakly informed or perhaps driven by opportunistic behavior. 
Information traders are those market participants who trade in 
the financial markets based on their own research or on 
recommendations from others.75 These traders “are willing and able 
to devote resources to gathering and analyzing information as a basis 
for their investment decisions.”76 Information traders include 
sophisticated professional investors such as activist hedge fund 
managers, money managers, and other market professionals.77 
Information traders look for differences between value and price 
based on the information they possess and “then trade to capture the 
value of their informational advantage.”78 Information traders move 
security prices toward their fundamental values and are in essence 
“the agents who render markets efficient.”79 
The value of information traders in the pricing of securities was 
 
 71. See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 63, at 724. 
 72. See id. at 724–25. 
 73. See id. at 725. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See id. at 723. Professors Goshen and Parchomovsky also include as information 
traders researchers and analysts who provide recommendations and advice. However, because 
we are describing investors in the context of shareholder activism, we will not include these 
market participants in our definition of information trader. See id. at 721. 
 76. Id. at 723 
 77. See id. 
 78. Id. at 726. 
 79. Id. at 719. 
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first pointed out by Sanford Grossman and Joseph Stiglitz.80 They 
noted that it is not possible for securities markets to operate without 
market participants investing in information and earning positive 
returns for their efforts. They argued that “because information is 
costly, prices cannot perfectly reflect the information which is 
available, since if it did, those who spent resources to obtain it would 
receive no compensation.”81 Instead, they argue, that what exists in 
capital markets “is an equilibrium degree of disequilibrium: prices 
reflect the information of informed individuals (arbitrageurs) but 
only partially, so that those who expend resources to obtain 
information do receive compensation.”82 
The insights provided by Grossman and Stiglitz mean that we 
should understand the pricing of any individual stock more in terms 
of having varying degrees of effectiveness, not efficiency.83 The 
efficient market hypothesis “states that in free and actively traded 
markets, stock prices will fully reflect all available information about 
the corporation.”84 However, this mechanistic understanding of 
markets implies that the seeking out of new information is futile. 
Instead, under Grossman and Stiglitz’s understanding of capital 
markets, information traders can now be understood to be financially 
rewarded for helping to make the market more efficient when 
seeking out new information on specific companies, without ever 
achieving a perfect equilibrium.85 They thereby help to expand the 
amount of data that can be utilized to value the stock of publicly 
traded companies,86 using their analytical skills to create a competing 
source of pricing information on the value of a public company’s 
stock, or, as argued in this Article, to create a sharing of authority 
 
 80. See generally Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of 
Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1980). 
 81. Id. at 405. 
 82. Id. at 393. 
 83. Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 63, at 730–31. 
 84. Barbara Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing with Reliance 
Requirements in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 435, 437–38 (1984). 
 85. See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 63, at 730–31. 
 86. For example, this has been helpful amidst the recent epidemic of Chinese companies 
that have utilized reverse mergers to trade on U.S. stock exchanges with inflated reported 
revenues and profits. See Sharfman, Why Proxy Access is Harmful, supra note 42, at 404–05. 
These misrepresentations would not have come to light without the costly information 
gathering of information traders, including the hiring of investigators to go out into the field 
and visit the operations of the targeted Chinese firms, into the activities of these companies. Id. 
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with the board of directors for certain discrete corporate decisions. 
All such activities make the market more efficient by moving the 
price of the stock toward its fundamental value.87 
However, even information traders may be rationally apathetic or 
reticent when it comes to becoming involved in corporate decision 
making.88 This is because, for the large majority of information 
traders, there are still large disparities in valuable, non-public 
information, skill in decision making, and interest in corporate 
governance between them and corporate management.89 Instead, 
these “value investors”90 specialize in utilizing the information they 
have gathered to identify differences between value and price and 
then trade the targeted stock to capture the value of this 
informational advantage.91 Whatever limited time, resources, and 
skill they have to devote to their work are targeted toward valuation, 
not corporate governance. 
Some information traders, including some hedge fund managers, 
are exceptions to this rule. These traders “take large positions in 
public companies as a means to effect change.”92 They are 
distinguished from value investors by their willingness to spend 
resources to identify operational, strategic, or personnel changes that 
they believe will enhance shareholder value and then spend even 
more resources to try to get the corporation to implement those 
changes.93 As detailed in the next Part, these traders are participating 
in what is called offensive shareholder activism.94 
 
 87. See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 63, at 730–31. 
 88. See Sharfman, supra note 68, at 906–07. 
 89. See id. 
 90. Gilson and Gordon refer to institutional investors who are value investors (earn 
returns based on fundamental analysis and diversification) and liquidity traders (earn returns 
through low cost diversification) as “rationally reticent.” Gilson & Gordon, supra note 12, at 
867. They vote, but they do not propose or get involved in trying to influence the 
management of the corporation. See id. According to Gilson and Gordon, “[i]nstitutional 
owners who are not seeking private benefits of control are rationally reticent; they also will 
assign a low value to governance rights since their proactive exercise will not improve the 
relative performance on which the institutional investor’s profitability and ability to attract 
assets depends.” Id. at 895 (footnote omitted). 
 91. Sharfman, supra note 68, at 907. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Cheffins & Armour, supra note 4, at 56–57. 
 94. Id. 
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III. OFFENSIVE SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 
Offensive shareholder activism, as identified by John Armour and 
Brian Cheffins,95 is performance-driven activism initiated primarily 
by a specific type of institutional investor: the hedge fund.96 It 
typically begins with a hedge fund97 accumulating a significant 
amount of a company’s stock.98 The catalyst for the accumulation is 
a determination by the hedge fund that the target company is 
currently not maximizing returns, but that if management would 
implement the hedge fund’s recommended changes, company 
performance would improve, the stock would increase in value, and 
the hedge fund would reap excess returns.99  
This activism is distinct from “defensive shareholder activism,” 
which refers to institutional investors that hold significant blocks of 
company stock and advocate for changes only when company 
fortunes decline.100 
 
 95. Id. Since these companies are rarely interested in gaining corporate control, 
Professors Cheffins and Armour refer to these activities in sum as the “market for corporate 
influence.” Id. at 58–59. 
 96. Id. at 53. 
 97. There is no consensus definition of “hedge fund.” However, for purposes of this 
Article we will identify these institutional investors by the following four characteristics as 
provided by Professors Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas: 
(1) they are pooled, privately organized investment vehicles; (2) they are 
administered by professional investment managers with performance-based 
compensation and significant investments in the fund; (3) they are not widely 
available to the public; and (4) they operate outside of securities regulation and 
registration requirements. More specifically, hedge funds avoid the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 by having a relatively small number of sophisticated investors. 
Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. 
FIN. 1729, 1735 (2008) (citation omitted). 
 98. Cheffins & Armour, supra note 4, at 56. Cheffins & Armour have identified 
instances of offensive shareholder activism going back to at least the first decade of the 
twentieth century. See Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, Offensive Shareholder Activism in 
U.S. Public Companies, 1900–49, 5–6 (Univ. of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 
09/2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1759983. 
 99. Cheffins & Armour, supra note 4, at 56. 
 100. Id. As explained by Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock: 
Mutual fund and public pension fund activism, if it occurs, tends to be incidental 
and ex post: when fund management notes that portfolio companies are 
underperforming, or that their governance regime is deficient, they will sometimes 
be active. In contrast, hedge fund activism is strategic and ex ante: hedge fund 
managers first determine whether a company would benefit from activism, then take 
a position and become active. 
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According to Cheffins and Armour: 
The readiness to take a hands-on role to shake things up is 
the crucial additional dimension to hedge fund activism. 
Activist hedge funds, rather than merely adopting the 
passive approach that characterizes value investing and 
waiting for the market to self-correct—which may well 
never happen if a company’s shares do not get noticed and 
instead drift lower—are prepared to take the initiative and 
accelerate matters by lobbying for changes calculated to 
boost shareholder returns.101 
Therefore, offensive shareholder activists are proactive while 
defensive shareholder activists are reactive.102 Moreover, relative to 
the typical information trader who is only value-investing and not 
participating in shareholder activism, offensive shareholder activists 
provide additional information to the corporation and the 
marketplace in the form of recommended changes to corporate 
strategy. 
The following is an example of offensive shareholder activism. In 
early 2012, Relational Investors LLC (Relational) began 
accumulating shares of the Timken Co. (NYSE: TKR). By June 30, 
2012, it had acquired approximately $65 million of Timken stock,103 
and by September 30, 2012, it had increased its holdings to 
approximately $120 million.104 On August 23, 2012, Relational 
made its first reported presentation to the company’s board, urging 
the board to split the company into two, with one part focusing on 
steel production and the other on ball bearings.105 This proposal was 
met with strong opposition from the board.106  
  
 
Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate 
Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1069 (2007) (footnote omitted). 
 101. Cheffins & Armour, supra note 4, at 58 (footnotes omitted). 
 102. See id. at 56. 
 103. See Relational Investors LLC, Quarterly Report (Form 13F-HR/A) (June 30, 
2012), available at http://www.sec.gov /Archives /edgar/data /1047644/   00010474691 
2010843/a2211829z13f-hra.txt. 
 104. See Relational Investors LLC, Quarterly Report (Form 13F) (Sept. 30, 2012), 
available at www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1047644/000104746912010845/ 
0001047469-12-010845.txt. 
 105. See Timken Co., Exhibit B (Form SC 13D/A) (Feb. 19, 2013), available at 
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/98362/000110465913011766/a13-5429_ 1ex99db.htm. 
 106. See id. 
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As a result, California State Teachers’ Retirement System 
(CalSTRS), with approval from Relational, placed a non-binding 
resolution in the company’s annual meeting proxy materials that 
called for such a split.107 This proposal was approved by a 53% 
majority of Timken shareholders at the annual shareholders meeting 
held May 7, 2013.108 As a result, the Timken board announced on 
June 10, 2013 that it had formed a Strategy Committee made up of 
independent directors to evaluate such a separation of businesses.109 
In addition, as reported on August 2, 2013, Relational increased its 
stake in Timken to 7.9%.110  
On September 5, 2013, the board of Timken “approved a plan 
to separate the Company’s steel business from its bearings and power 
transmission business through a spinoff.”111 Of most interest to 
Timken stockholders, the price of Timken stock responded by rising 
2.9% to $62.02, the highest price since at least January 4, 1978.112 
On June 30, 2014, Timken distributed 100% of its interest in its 
steel operations to the holders of the company’s common stock.113 
The Timken example illustrates how offensive shareholder 
activists can reap handsome rewards for themselves and for the 
company as a whole by successfully advocating for internal changes 
within the corporation that take advantage of unrealized value which 
only they, and not the board of directors, were able to perceive. We  
 
 
 107. See Timken Co., Schedule 14A (Form SC 14A) (Mar. 21, 2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/98362/000119312513118303/d494162ddef14
a.htm. 
 108. Timken Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 8, 2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/98362/000119312513207498/d534241d8k.htm. 
 109. The Timken Company Establishes Board Strategy Committee to Evaluate Separation of 
Steel Business, PR NEWSWIRE (June 10, 2013, 4:05 PM), http://news.timken.com/
index.php?s=12504&item=136827. 
 110. See Timken Co., Schedule 13D (Form SC 13D/A) (Aug. 2, 2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/98362/000110465913059738/a13-
17712_1sc13da.htm. 
 111. Timken Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) (September 5, 2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/98362/000119312513361485/d595784d8k.htm. 
 112. Leslie Picker & Thomas Black, Timken Jumps After Agreeing to Spin Off Steel Unit, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 6, 2013, 4:36 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-
06/timken-jumps-after-agreeing-to-spin-off-steel-unit.html. 
 113. See Timken Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 30, 2014), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/98362/000009836214000094/a8kforsteelspinof
.htm. 
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next turn to a theoretical explanation of offensive shareholder 
activism. 
A. Offensive Shareholder Activism as a Sharing of Authority 
According to Arrow, “[t]he basic deficiency of irresponsible 
authority from the functional view point is the likelihood of 
unnecessary error.”114 Moreover, “[e]rror is unnecessary when the 
information is available somewhere in the organization but not 
available to or not used by the authority.”115 According to Arrow, 
“others in the organization may have access to superior information 
on at least some matters.”116 Therefore, it is legitimate to criticize 
such authority, allowing for a “corrective mechanism” when 
necessary.117 
As noted earlier, it follows that a shift in decision-making 
authority or, more accurately, a sharing of authority between the 
board and a shareholder or small group of shareholders may be more 
efficient in certain discrete situations.118 For those who seek 
enhanced corporate decisions through shareholder activism, the issue 
becomes identifying those situations in which it is more efficient to 
share decision making with shareholders. 
Offensive shareholder activism often serves as a corrective 
mechanism and thus results in a legitimate sharing of authority on a 
discrete basis. The traditional understanding of shareholder activism 
is that it is a tool of accountability used to minimize agency costs. 
For example, activism may reduce agency costs that result from 
management shirking or rent seeking,119 or from an inability by the 
board to breach implicit agreements that the corporation has 
maintained for a long period of time but have, for whatever reason, 
 
 114. ARROW, supra note 42, at 73–74. 
 115. Id. at 74. 
 116. Id. at 75. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Sharfman, supra note 68, at 905. 
 119. According to Professors Matsusaka and Ozbas, “[f]acing an active shareholder who 
seeks to maximize profit, a manager suffering from an agency problem may compromise by 
choosing an action that is closer to profit maximization than would otherwise have been 
chosen.” John G. Matsusaka & Oguzhan Ozbas, Managerial Accommodation, Proxy Access, 
and the Cost of Shareholder Empowerment 3–4 (Marshall Sch. of Bus. Working Paper No. FBE 
02-12, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1984606. 
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outlived their usefulness.120 Alternatively, the cause for activism could 
be a lack of good decision-making ability on the part of the board 
and executive management as a group or in their respective 
capacities.121 Whatever the cause, the real thrust of offensive 
shareholder activism is to challenge board decision making when it is 
not maximizing shareholder wealth. Very simply, the offensive 
shareholder activist thinks it has a superior approach to enhancing 
shareholder wealth. Additionally, while insiders have informational 
advantages over offensive activists regarding firm-specific 
information, offensive activists may possess, on a discrete basis, 
decision-making skills, superior information about competitors, or 
other important decision-making inputs that erode or even eclipse 
the overall informational advantages of the board and managers. 
B. The Small Problem of Uninformed Shareholders 
The glitch in offensive shareholder activism is that if the challenge 
to board authority ultimately leads to a proxy vote, then shareholders 
as a body must decide how to proceed. In this scenario, the two 
competing loci of authority with the most specialized expertise and 
information to make corporate decisions, the board and the offensive 
shareholder activist, are relegated to the sidelines as pitchmen for their 
respective positions during the shareholder vote. Given that a 
significant percentage of a company’s shareholders may be non-
information traders, this may lead to sub-optimal decision making.  
Fortunately, the problem of uninformed shareholders as the 
ultimate arbiters of whether or not offensive shareholder activism is 
wealth enhancing is mitigated by the fact that there has been 
relatively few proxy votes resulting from such activism. Brav, Jiang, 
Partnoy, and Thomas report that only 13% of hedge fund activism 
(as represented primarily by a hedge fund’s filing of an SEC form 
Schedule 13D) resulted in a proxy contest, while Klein and Zur 
reported that only 12% of offensive shareholder activism initiated by 
hedge funds and other activists resulted in a proxy contest.122 It 
 
 120. Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth Maximization, supra note 42, at 417 n.151 (citing 
Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE 
TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 33 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988)). 
 121. See ARROW, supra note 42, at 74. 
 122. Brav et al., supra note 97, at 1743; April Klein & Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial 
Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors, 64 J. FIN. 187, 213, 215 
(2009). 
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appears then that the mere threat of a proxy contest is often enough 
to get the board to seriously consider the recommendations of the 
offensive shareholder activist and implement those recommendations 
in a significant number of instances. Thus, the problem of allowing 
uninformed shareholders to participate in the decision-making 
process can be avoided in the overwhelming number of instances 
where offensive shareholder activism has been implemented. 
C. Empirical Analysis of Offensive Shareholder Activism 
In an Arrowian approach to corporate governance, the key 
question is why should corporate board authority ever yield to 
shareholder accountability? In other words, under what 
circumstances should the board permit shareholders to influence 
corporate policy? 
If we use as our metrics the creation of shareholder value and 
improved firm performance, the available empirical evidence suggests 
that board members should be cautious in how they allow 
shareholders to influence corporate strategy. In terms of 
performance-related activism, only offensive shareholder activism has 
been found to actually enhance shareholder wealth.123 Furthermore, 
 
 123. The empirical work of Boyson and Mooradian has led them to conclude that 
“aggressive activism [defined as “activism having a specific motive other than ‘communication’ 
or ‘investment purposes only’”] and activism targeting changes in corporate governance 
[board representation and enhanced cash flow] are strongly related to improvement in long-
term performance and improvement in cash positions . . . .” Nicole M. Boyson & Robert M. 
Mooradian, Corporate Governance and Hedge Fund Activism, 14 REV. DERIVATIVES RES. 169, 
178, 201 (2011); 
Activism [hedge fund] that targets the sale of the company or changes in business 
strategy, such as refocusing and spinning-off noncore assets, is associated with the 
largest positive abnormal partial effects . . . . In contrast, we find that the market 
response to capital structure-related activism—including debt restructuring, 
recapitalization, dividends, and share repurchases—is positive yet insignificant. We 
find a similar lack of statistically meaningful reaction for governance-related 
activism—including attempts to rescind takeover defenses, to oust CEOs, to 
enhance board independence, and to curtail CEO compensation. 
Brav et al., supra note 97, at 1731. See also Christopher P. Clifford, Value Creation or 
Destruction? Hedge Funds as Shareholder Activists, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 323, 324 (2008) (finding 
that firms targeted by hedge funds for active purposes earn larger, positive returns than firms 
targeted by hedge funds for passive purpose; this control group contained hedge funds that 
filed Schedule 13Gs); Robin M. Greenwood & Michael Schor, Investor Activism and 
Takeovers, 92 J. FIN. ECON. 362, 368–70 (2009) (finding that activists are most successful at 
creating value when they are able to force a change in control); Klein & Zur, supra note 122 at 
217 (focusing on activist campaigns by both hedge funds and other types of entrepreneurial 
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significant wealth enhancement has been found only where the 
activism has led to “the sale of the company or changes in business 
strategy, such as refocusing and spinning-off noncore assets.”124 An 
example of this would be Relational’s recommendation that Timken 
Co. spin off its steel operations into a separate public company in 
order to increase the price of the company’s stock. Recent research 
suggests we can delve even further and find that while both 
experienced and inexperienced offensive shareholder activsts create 
significant wealth and performance enhancement within a corporation, 
experienced activists do better than inexperienced activists.125 
In empirical research, offensive shareholder activists are usually 
identified by their filing of the SEC form Schedule 13D. Such a 
filing is required when an investor crosses over the 5% threshold of 
stock ownership and has at least some intention to influence the 
corporation either immediately or in the future.126 The filing 
requirement applies not only to hedge funds, but also to all other 
types of entrepreneurial activist investors (private equity firms, 
venture capitalists, asset management groups, and private 
individuals).127 An investor files the shorter Schedule 13G if it only 
intends to invest passively and not influence corporate decision 
making.128 
Based on our prior discussion, the pricing of shares in the 
presence of offensive shareholder activism can be explained as 
follows: at the time the offensive shareholder activist reveals that it 
 
activists, the study found that both types of campaigns produced average abnormal returns for 
target shareholders). 
 124. Brav et al., supra note 97, at 1731. See also Greenwood & Schor, supra note 123, at 
363 (finding that abnormal positive returns only existed when the activism was associated with 
the ultimate sale of the target to a third party). 
 125. Nicole M. Boyson, Linlin Ma & Robert Mooradian, Are All Hedge Fund Activists 
Created Equal? The Impact of Experience on Hedge Fund Activism 1 (March 21, 2014) (on file 
with authors) (“[O]ur results imply that more experienced activists deliver better short-term 
performance and long-term outcomes for target firms.”). Interestingly, they find that “relative 
to less frequent activists, more frequent activists choose larger firms with less cash, better stock 
and operating performance, and a larger distance to default.” Id. at 3. 
 126. See Schedule 13D, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 5, 2012), 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/sched13.htm. 
 127. See id. April Klein and Emanuel Zur appropriately point out that offensive 
shareholder activism is not the sole province of hedge funds, but can also include any other 
type of private individual or entity who takes a significant stake in a company and then 
advocates for corporate change. See Klein & Zur, supra note 122, at 187. 
 128. See SEC Rule on Filing of Schedules 13D and 13G, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2011). 
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has made a significant investment in the company, the stock market 
does not know if the proposed changes are expected to be superior, 
equal, or inferior to what the board and management is expected to 
implement. All the market knows, at least at the time the hedge fund 
files its Schedule 13D, is that an information trader has made a 
significant investment in a particular company and expects excess 
returns if its recommended changes are implemented. Many 
investors who actively trade in the stock market will no doubt try to 
free ride on this investor’s research, analysis, and recommendations 
and will invest in the company stock without having to expend 
resources in such work. This new demand among free-riding 
investors allows the stock to have at least a short-term run-up in 
market price, regardless of whether the hedge fund is right or wrong 
in its approach to enhancing corporate performance.129 
If so, empirical studies on offensive shareholder activism, usually 
in the form of event studies, may simply be reporting on this short-
term run-up in the prices of the targeted stocks. The abnormal 
returns may soon disappear once information traders have had time 
to properly evaluate the recommendations for the postive (or 
negative) value they may provide and then estimate the probability 
that these recommendations will actually be implemented.  
However, it has not been the case that these abnormal positive 
returns have disappeared over time. Studies by Boyson and 
Mooradian130 and Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas131 have 
demonstrated that the short-term run-up in stock prices from hedge 
fund activism persists for at least a year after the filing of a Schedule 
13D. Perhaps most importantly, a recent study by Bebchuk, Brav, 
and Jiang has shown that hedge fund activism does not result in 
abnormal negative returns over a five-year period.132 This indicates 
 
 129. Based on the ability of offensive shareholder activists to earn consistent returns, it 
should not be surprising that a general herding effect has been observed where institutional 
investors, such as mutual funds, follow after the trading patterns of hedge funds. See Yawen 
Jiao & Pengfei Ye, Mutual Fund Herding in Response to Hedge Fund Herding and the Impacts 
on Stock Prices J. BANKING & FIN. (forthcoming 2014), available at 
http://faculty.ucr.edu/~yawenj/mfhf.pdf. Moreover, Jiao and Ye observed that “[m]utual 
funds’ following of hedge funds leads to a significant price impact in the same quarter and 
more importantly, a sharp price reversal in the next quarter, whereas hedge fund herding itself 
does not destabilize prices.” Id. at 35. 
 130. Boyson, Ma & Mooradian, supra note 125. 
 131. Brav et al., supra note 97. 
 132. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund 
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that the information provided to the marketplace and corporations 
by offensive shareholder activism is generally perceived to be valuable 
to shareholders and is being integrated into corporate strategy in a 
statistically significant way. 
On a macro level, empirical studies have shown that at least 
certain types of offensive shareholder activism are beneficial for 
shareholders.133 However, the results of empirical studies must be 
interpreted carefully so as not to overstate their informational value. 
Empirical research does not suggest that every time a hedge fund 
takes a substantial position in a company and then recommends 
changes that correspond to postive abnormal returns in empirical 
studies, those changes are correct for that particular company.134 The 
reason for this can be found in the limitations associated with 
empirical analysis. For example, an event study focusing on the filing 
of a Schedule 13D, the type of study generally used to evaluate the 
value of hedge fund activity, requires a large sample size of 
companies because of the individual volatility of an individual 
company’s stock price.135 That is, the statistical power where the 
sample size is one is “likely to be quite low.”136 One reason for this is 
that the variability of returns for a sample size of one is much greater 
 
Activism (Columbia Bus. Sch. Research Paper No. 13-66, 2013), available at http://papers.s
srn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2291577. For empirical results consistent with these 
studies but focusing on hedge fund activity outside the United States, see Dionysia 
Katelouzou, Myths and Realities of Hedge Fund Activism: Some Empirical Evidence, 7 VA. L. & 
BUS. REV. 459, 479 (2013) (“Of the 379 investments for which a holding period could be 
determined, 100 (26.4%) were for less than one year (short-term), 131 (34.6%) were for 
between one and three years (medium term), and 148 (39.1%) were for more than three years 
(long term).”). 
 133. See Nicole M. Boyson & Robert M. Mooradian, Experienced Hedge Fund Activists 
(AFA Chi. Meetings Paper, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1787649 (finding 
that hedge fund activism by “experienced” managers significantly contributes to hedge fund 
profitability, justifying an investment in the pursuit of activism). 
 134. For example, after a three-year attempt to turnaround J.C. Penney, Pershing Square 
Capital Management finally gave up and sold its 39.1 million shares in the company for a loss 
of approximately $473 million. Mr. William Ackman, the manager of Pershing Square, thought 
he could turn around J.C. Penney with new management. However, his new management 
team was not successful in improving operating results or increasing the stock price by the time 
of Pershing Square’s disinvestment. See Michael J. de la Merced, His Links Severed, Ackman 
Sells Stake in J.C. Penney, DEALBOOK (Aug. 26, 2013, 5:22 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/26/ackman-moves-to-sell-stake-in-j-c-penney/. 
 135. See Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Empirical Studies of Corporate Law, 
HANDBOOK L. & ECON. 1, 12 (2005). 
 136. Id. 
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than even a sample size of just a couple of stocks.137 Also, where the 
sample size is one, it is hard to separate out the significance of other 
events on the stock price.138 Moreover, empirical studies have to be 
periodically replicated not just to test the validity of the results, but 
because the data changes over time, and therefore the statistical 
relationships change as well.139 
Thus, one interpretation of the results of empirical studies is that 
they may support the argument that certain types of offensive 
shareholder activism have value, but they do not provide conclusive 
proof that offensive shareholder activism has value at any specific 
company at any specific time.140 Instead, the use of empirical 
evidence supporting offensive shareholder activism should be 
understood as merely supporting the notion that offensive 
shareholder activists should be permitted to rebut the general 
presumption of superiority of existing managerial strategies. This 
understanding provides the board with the option of implementing 
the recommendations, in whole or in part, or explaining to the 
company’s shareholders why some or all of the recommendations 
would not add value as a means to pre-empt a possible proxy 
contest. 
Alternatively, when empirical analysis does not support a certain 
type of performance-driven activism, such as defensive shareholder 
activism or offensive shareholder activism that focuses on debt 
restructuring, the activist bears a commensurately higher burden in 
overcoming the general presumption in favor of the board’s own 
strategies and policies. 
  
 
 137. See id. 
 138. See id. 
 139. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 38–54 
(2002). 
 140. Hedge fund activism even results in unknown “spillover” effects that reach beyond 
the targeted firms. See, e.g., Nickolay Gantchev, Oleg Gredil & Chotibhak Jotikasthira, 
Governance Under the Gun: Spillover Effects of Hedge Fund Activism (March 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2356544. 
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IV. SHORT-TERM VERSUS LONG-TERM INVESTORS 
In this Part, we attempt to address one of the primary criticisms 
of offensive shareholder activism: that such activists promote “short-
termism” since they ignore what is best for the corporation in the 
long-term.141 According to Bebchuk: 
Short-termism refers to companies taking actions that are profitable 
in the short term but value-decreasing in the long term, such as 
increasing near-term earnings by cutting research that would pay 
off later on. Activist investors with short investment horizons, it is 
argued, seek actions that boost short-term stock price at the 
expense of long-term value and often succeed in pressuring 
companies to take such actions.142 
According to Martin Lipton, a leading corporate lawyer, such 
short-termism is a specialty of activist hedge funds: 
Institutional investors on average own more than 70% of the shares 
of the major public companies. Their voting power is being 
harnessed by a gaggle of activist hedge funds who troll through 
SEC filings looking for opportunities to demand a change in a 
company’s strategy or portfolio that will create a short-term profit 
without regard to the impact on the company’s long-term 
prospects.143 
Notwithstanding these concerns, a pejorative view of investors 
who have short-term investment time horizons, especially hedge 
fund activists, is mystifying on several counts. First, all shareholders, 
whether they have a short- or long-term investment horizon, value 
shares that have significant liquidity. That is, all shareholders want to 
have the ability to sell their shares at a moment’s notice at the 
maximum price possible. For example, a long-term investor such as a 
pension fund may suddenly become a short-term investor or invest 
in small amounts in order to meet the demands of its beneficiaries. 
 
 141. Martin Lipton, Bite the Apple; Poison the Apple; Paralyze the Company; Wreck the 
Economy, HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 26, 2013, 
9:22 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/02/26/bite-the-apple-poison-the-
apple-paralyze-the-company-wreck-the-economy/. 
 142. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1638–39 (2013). 
 143. Lipton, supra note 141. 
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Or short-term investors may decide to hold onto their stock for a 
much longer period of time than originally anticipated and then sell 
at a later date. A liquid market provides this sell/hold option. Thus, 
the more liquidity a stock is perceived to have, the greater its value 
to both types of investors, all else being equal. 
Second, the process of valuing a company’s stock is the same for 
investors no matter what their expected holding period. Both short- 
and long-term investors will estimate the company’s expected cash 
flows out into the future and then utilize a discount rate to come up 
with a present value. Both will use a long-term time horizon to do 
this calculation, regardless of their expected holding period. 
Therefore, both types of investors want the board of directors and 
executive management to make the most efficient and shareholder-
wealth-enhancing decisions—whether it be short-term cost cutting 
or investing in a long-term project—in order to maximize the 
current value of the stock price.144 
If a hedge fund argues for short-term cost cutting at a company, 
this means it expects this approach to maximize the value of the 
company stock relative to other possible wealth-enhancing options. 
Indeed, such a recommended approach may simply be an attempt to 
shift the company to a lower risk level that is more in line with the 
company’s potential returns. If so, then the stock price should rise. 
Alternatively, a hedge fund could argue for more investment in basic 
research if it thought that this would yield a higher stock market 
price. Ultimately, offensive shareholder activists should be indifferent 
to the types of recommendations they make as long as they believe 
the recommendations will result in the highest possible stock price. 
According to Kahan and Rock: 
For the short-term trading horizon of hedge funds to generate a 
short-term investment outlook for hedge fund managers, the stock 
market must suffer from myopia: that is, it must undervalue long-
 
 144. According to Black and Kraakman:  
Under elementary principles of finance, even short-term investors have an incentive 
to maximize the firm’s long-term value, because only by doing so can they 
maximize the price at which long-term investors will buy the shares that short-term 
investors will soon want to sell (the unity of long- and short-term shareholder 
interests is known as Fisher separation).  
Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for 
Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 521, 532–33 (2002). 
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term investments relative to short-term investments. If the market 
does not itself suffer from such a bias, then the interests of 
investors with short-term trading horizons will not conflict with 
those of investors with long-term trading horizons.145 
Moreover, if the stock market thought hedge funds and other 
private individuals engaged in offensive shareholder activism were 
promoting recommendations that were heavily biased toward short-
term opportunities, to the exclusion of many profitable long-term 
opportunities, then we would expect empirical studies to show such 
activism to be wealth reducing in the short term, not wealth 
enhancing. So far, the studies cited in Part III.C have shown this not 
to be the case. 
Third, this perception of offensive shareholder activists as only 
caring about the short-term may simply be a result of their business 
model, which requires them to have relatively short holding periods. 
Think of offensive shareholder activists as specialists in identifying 
significant impediments to maximizing shareholder wealth that are 
not being addressed by the board of a targeted company. For 
offensive shareholder activists to maximize their returns, they cannot 
have long holding periods. This is because once they remove the 
impediment to shareholder wealth maximization, they must move on 
to the next corporation in order to maximize the number of 
interventions and thus the profits of their own investors. 
Alternatively, it is not possible for long-term investors like Warren 
Buffet and Berkshire Hathaway to participate in that market precisely 
because they have such long holding periods. Therefore, long-term 
investors must yield that market to offensive shareholder activists 
who complement and enhance the wealth of long-term investors.146 
  
 
 145. Kahan & Rock, supra note 100, at 1084. See also George W. Dent, Jr., The Essential 
Unity of Shareholders and the Myth of Investor Short-Termism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97, 116–19, 
122–28 (2010) (arguing that this alleged short-termism on the part of institutional investors, 
including hedge funds, is of dubious validity and noting that such short-termism has not been 
empirically verified). 
 146. An interesting example of how investors with different investment horizons 
complement each other comes from the market for corporate control. In 2014, H.L. Heinz 
was acquired by Berkshire Hathaway and 3G Capital, a Brazilian private equity firm, for $23 
million in a fifty-fifty split. The day-to-day operations will be handled by 3G Capital, and in a 
few years, after it has enhanced its operations, it is expected to sell its equity stake to Berkshire 
Hathaway. See LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, BERKSHIRE BEYOND BUFFETT: THE ENDURING 
VALUE OF VALUES 15–17 (Columbia Univ. Press 2014). 
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Fourth, the studies cited in Part III.C have demonstrated that 
the short-term run-up in stock prices from hedge fund activism 
persists for at least a year after the filing of a Schedule 13D,147 and 
the initial positive stock price performance of hedge fund activism is 
not reversed over a subsequent five-year period.148 Such results 
confirm the benefits of offensive shareholder activism for the long-
term, not just the short-term.149 
A. The Intrinsic Value Argument 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, critics of offensive shareholder 
activism can make what can be referred to as the “intrinsic value” or 
“hidden value” argument.150 They may claim that the board, and 
especially executive management, are specialists in the management 
of the company and are the only ones privy to confidential 
information on the performance and prospects of the company they 
manage. Unfortunately, it is not empirically known how much 
informational asymmetry exists between management and 
shareholders at any firm at any point in time.151 It may be a little, it 
may be a lot; the extent of the asymmetry is not known and may be 
unknowable.152 However, it is beyond doubt that information 
asymmetries do exist153 and that shareholders, including offensive 
shareholder activists, are at an informational disadvantage relative to 
directors. In sum, the board and executive management are in the 
 
 147. See Boyson & Mooradian, supra note 123; Brav et al., supra note 97; Klein & Zur, 
supra note 122 (such abnormal positive returns also persist for a year when the investor is a 
private individual or entity but not a hedge fund). 
 148. See Bebchuk, Brav & Jiang, supra note 132. 
 149. See id. 
 150. Black and Kraakman list nine assumptions upon which the “hidden value” model of 
valuation rests. Black & Kraakman, supra note 144, at 529–33. However, according to 
Kihlstrom and Wachter, only five are actually required to support the notion of hidden value. 
Richard E. Kihlstrom & Michael L. Wachter, Corporate Policy and the Coherence of Delaware 
Takeover Law, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 523, 533–34 (2003). These five assumptions are that (1) 
the board has private information as to company value, (2) there are barriers to this 
information being communicated to the market, (3) the valuation gap between valuations 
based on the company’s private versus the market’s public information can be large, (4) 
valuation gaps persist over a significant period of time, and (5) the market for corporate 
control cannot eliminate the valuation gaps. See id. at 534 n.34. 
 151. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder 
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 696 (2010). 
 152. See id. 
 153. See id. 
01.SHARFMAN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/22/2015 4:56 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2014 
1048 
best position to estimate the company’s intrinsic or fundamental 
value, not the market or any of its participants. 
If so, the critics’ argument follows, then the role of the board 
and its executive management is not necessarily to maximize the 
market share price, but to maximize the “intrinsic value” of the 
company’s shares.154 But we must also assume that the board is 
dedicated to maximizing this value and that they have the proper 
techniques for measuring intrinsic value.155 
What Lipton and others who argue against offensive shareholder 
activism are suggesting when they refer to hedge fund activists 
suffering from short-termism is that these investors are not privy to 
the entire opportunity set of strategic options available to the 
corporation that will enhance shareholder wealth.156 Moreover, even 
regarding the options that are publicly known, the activists do not 
have as much information as the board and executive management in 
regard to their benefits and costs. Also, if most of this confidential 
information relates to the board and executive management’s vision 
for the company’s long-term future, then the recommendations from 
offensive shareholder activists may look to management like they are 
focused on the short term. 
Yet, this argument does not necessarily make offensive 
shareholder activists the purveyors of an inefficient approach to 
corporate decision making in all fact patterns. Perhaps they have less 
firm-specific information than management, but as compensation 
they may not be prone to agency costs resulting from management 
shirking, rent seeking,157 or an inability to breach costly implicit 
 
 154. Henry T.C. Hu, Efficient Markets and the Law: A Predictable Past and an 
Uncertain Future, 4 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 179 (2012). See also Roger J. Dennis, Valuing the 
Firm and the Development of Delaware Corporate Law, 17 RUTGERS L. J. 1 (1985). 
 155. See id. This “intrinsic value” approach has been endorsed by the Delaware courts. 
According to the Delaware Supreme Court, “it is not a breach of faith for directors to 
determine that the present stock market price of shares is not representative of true value or 
that there may indeed be several market values for any corporation’s stock. We have so held in 
another context.” Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 n.12 (Del. 
1990) (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 876 (Del. 1985)). In Van Gorkom, the 
court stated: “The fact that the Board had no reasonably adequate information indicative of 
the intrinsic value of the Company, other than a concededly depressed market price, was 
without question material to the shareholders voting on the merger.” Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 
at 890. For better or worse, intrinsic value is the default principle of corporate law. See Black & 
Kraakman, supra note 144, at 557. 
 156. See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 141. 
 157. According to Professors Matsusaka and Ozbas, “[f]acing an active shareholder who 
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agreements.158 Alternatively, offensive shareholder activists may have 
relatively better decision-making skills in a particular area of 
expertise.159 This is the inference that we believe is generated by 
empirical work on offensive shareholder activism, counteracting the 
intrinsic value argument. 
B. Proxy Access 
Proxy access is one area which can immediately benefit from the 
elimination of the idea that activist hedge funds are practitioners of 
short-termism. Proxy access allows certain shareholders “the ability 
to place their director nominees alongside the board’s slate of 
director nominees in the company’s proxy card and proxy 
statement.”160 Recently, the SEC amended Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to allow 
shareholder proposals on proxy access to become part of a public 
company’s proxy materials.161 Sharfman has previously argued that 
proxy access proposals, if they must be proposed and approved by a 
majority of shareholders, should not include a minimum holding 
period for shareholders to participate in nominating a candidate for 
board membership.162 Such a requirement would essentially deny 
offensive shareholder activists the ability to participate in proxy 
access. These activists want to participate in the corporate decision-
making process now, not in two or three years from now, and unlike 
 
seeks to maximize profit, a manager suffering from an agency problem may compromise by 
choosing an action that is closer to profit maximization than would otherwise have been 
chosen.” Matsusaka & Ozbas, supra note 119, at 3. 
 158. See Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth Maximization, supra note 42, at 417 n.151 (citing 
Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE 
TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 33 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1991)). 
 159. See ARROW, supra note 42, at 74. 
 160. See Sharfman, Why Proxy Access is Harmful, supra note 42, at 388. 
 161. On September 15, 2011, the SEC published a release providing notice that the 
amendment to Rule 14a-8(i)(8), allowing for shareholder proposals on proxy access, is to be 
effective with the publication of the notice in the Federal Register. See Facilitating Shareholder 
Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 9259, 101 SEC Docket 3784 (Sept. 15, 
2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 200, 232, 240, 249). The notice was published in the Federal 
Register on September 20, 2011. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 58, 100-01 (Sept. 20, 2011). Prior to the recently enacted Section 112 of the Delaware 
General Corporation Law, an argument could have been made that proxy access proposals 
were not a proper subject for action by shareholders under state law, and therefore could be 
excluded from a company’s proxy materials under SEC Rule 14a-8(i)(1). Section 112 explicitly 
authorizes, but does not require, bylaws granting shareholders access to the corporation’s 
proxy materials to nominate directors. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (2011). 
 162. See Sharfman, Why Proxy Access is Harmful, supra note 42, at 409–10. 
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the majority of shareholders, have made the necessary investment to 
understand the company. It is hard to understand the logic in having 
a two- or three-year holding period that favors passive investors such 
as liquidity traders over information traders such as offensive 
shareholders activists. Investors who have held large amounts of 
company stock for 20 years in one or more portfolios using passive 
strategies, and therefore do not analyze information about the 
company targeted for proxy access, are generally much less qualified 
to utilize proxy access than investors who have held company stock 
for six months but made their decision to invest based on 
fundamental analysis and the desire to implement significant change 
at a corporation.  
V. CONCLUSION 
A model of corporate governance that gives great deference to 
board authority is not inconsistent with tools of accountability that 
require a sharing of that authority under certain fact patterns. For 
example, under corporate law, judges and chancellors give great 
deference to board authority under the business judgment rule 
unless they find that such decisions were tainted with established 
filters such as gross negligence, conflict of interest, or lack of 
independence.163 At that point, judges and chancellors have the right 
to weigh in on the merits of the decision. 
For our purposes, the issue is identifying when, if ever, 
shareholder activism should lead to a similar sharing of decision 
making with shareholders. That is, how can we identify when 
shareholder activism is of value to corporate decision making? 
Identifying the value of shareholder activism begins with empirical 
studies that identify which types of shareholder activism will, in 
general, enhance shareholder wealth.164 So far, empirical evidence has 
 
 163. See Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth Maximization, supra note 42, at 392. 
 164. Even though it is beyond the scope of the Article, it should be noted that the only 
type of corporate governance activism that has been empirically demonstrated to enhance 
shareholder wealth is that associated with the elimination of staggered boards. Multiple 
empirical studies support the argument that staggered boards reduce shareholder wealth. See, 
e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful 
Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 
890–91 (2002); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. 
ECON. 409, 410 (2005); Alma Cohen & Charles C. Y. Wang, How Do Staggered Boards Affect 
Shareholder Value? Evidence from a Natural Experiment 1, 3–4 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Acct. & 
Mgmt. Unit, Working Paper No. 13-068, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
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only been able to demonstrate that one type of performance-driven 
activism—offensive shareholder activism associated with “the sale of 
the company or changes in business strategy, such as refocusing and 
spinning-off noncore assets”165—will, in general, enhance 
shareholder wealth. 
From a theoretical standpoint, the empirical evidence provided 
allows us to argue that certain types of offensive shareholder activism 
have the potential to act as a legitimate corrective mechanism in an 
Arrowian framework of corporate governance. As such, these types 
of offensive shareholder activism are consistent with the traditional 
authority model of corporate law and governance, even accepting, as 
Bainbridge has stated, that the “[p]reservation of managerial 
discretion should always be the null hypothesis.”166  
 
 
abstract=2141410. But see, K. J. Martijn Cremers, Lubomir P. Litov & Simone M. Sepe, 
Staggered Boards and Firm Value, Revisited (July 14, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2364165 (finding staggered boards to be 
positively associated with shareholder wealth maximization). 
However, empirical studies have not been able to show that corporate governance 
activism targeting other types of corporate governance arrangements enhances shareholder 
wealth. According to Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas, corporate governance activism does 
not enhance shareholder wealth when it involves an attempt to repeal takeover defenses, 
replace a CEO, increase board independence, or limit CEO compensation. Brav et al., supra 
note 97, at 1731. Bhagat and Black demonstrate that enhanced board independence does not 
increase shareholder wealth. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship 
Between Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921, 924, 928, 932 (1999). 
See also Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Corporate Governance and the Board of 
Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 101, 
101–04 (1985). Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach describe studies that show how splitting the 
CEO and chairman of the board positions does not enhance shareholder wealth. Renée B. 
Adams, Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, The Role of Boards of Directors in 
Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey, 48 J. ECON. LITERATURE 58, 
81–82 (2010) (surveying the literature on the separation of CEO and Chairman). Ali C. 
Akyol, Wei Fen Lim, and Patrick Verwijmeren find statistically significant negative returns 
associated with the SEC’s attempts to provide proxy access to certain shareholders. Ali C. 
Akyol, Wei Fen Lim, & Patrick Verwijmeren, Shareholders in the Boardroom: Wealth Effects of 
the SEC’s Proposal to Facilitate Director Nominations, 47 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
1029 (2012). See also Thomas Stratmann & J.W. Verret, Does Shareholder Proxy Access Damage 
Shareholder Value in Small Publicly Traded Companies?, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1431 (2012). Such 
studies create a presumption that activism encouraging such corporate governance 
arrangements are not good for the target firm and therefore requires the activist to make a 
convincing case that such changes can indeed enhance shareholder value. In contrast to 
offensive shareholder activism, the burden of proof is now on the activist, not the other way 
around. 
 165. Brav et al., supra note 97, at 1731. 
 166. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule, supra note 42, at 109. 
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